Technology and the Struggle for Democracy in Closed Societies

So who has the upper hand when it comes to using technology to further their goals in authoritarian countries, the good guys or the bad guys? It is often said that in the early days of the Internet that many believed the technology alone will lead to democratic change in closed societies. Our team at NDI was born in the mid-90s (1996 to be precise) and honestly, we’ve never held this view (see how we feel about this in this post about how tech is only effective in bringing about political change when combined with good organization and strong organizations).

Nonetheless, technology does play an important role for both activists and regimes in closed societies. However, in strong and sophisticated authoritarian states, the state will usually have the technological advantage over citizens because of their control of communications networks. There is no such thing as fully secure communications in these environments – which is critical for effective political organizing. These regimes can easily control access to and monitor the Internet as well as both mobile and fixed-line phone networks, allowing them to block or conduct surveillance at their leisure. Some technology companies cooperate in these activities, and in other countries the governments have even “outsourced” these activities to private or state-owned companies, typically mobile and Internet service providers, by using them as intermediaries responsible for the implementation of their repressive policies. Satellite communications provide some opportunity, but they are often cumbersome, difficult to conceal and can be expensive.

In addition, sophisticated states like China and Iran, among others, have increasingly clever ways to gain access to individual computers either physically or remotely, and monitor the location of phones so that an individual's security and communications cannot be guaranteed even when using sophisticated encryption, proxy/routing or satellite technologies. For these reasons, NDI takes a very tempered and cautious approach to introducing technologies in these environments and embraces the following guidelines:

• Any organization supporting development or introduction of communications tools in these environments must fully assess and understand the risks to avoid putting partners or citizens at risk. Engaging IT communications security professionals in technical and non-technical program design is essential.
• The best knowledge of the risk usually lies within the countries involved, given the differing techniques and technologies used by different regimes. Risk can be assessed only by examining both the general vulnerabilities of the technologies combined with local knowledge from partners and like-minded IT security experts in the country involved.
• Secure communication, within a country or across borders, can only be maximized by using a combination of technology solutions and strict procedures. There is no single solution or tool to ensure secure communication; every environment, set of communications needs and risk situation is different. A secure communications plan must be tailored to your specific needs and environment.
• NGO program strategies must include sharing information on technology risks and approaches with partners who must make the decisions about how or if the technologies will be used.

Another important part of the equation is the risk to untrained citizens who use technologies in these situations. Risks for activists can at best be minimized; this requires a complex set of technologies and procedures that must be artfully designed for the specific political environment and diligently adhered to. Many activists are fully aware of and willing to take the risks required. However, there are also risks for average, untrained citizens involved in political movements, including those using technology tools much less sophisticated than advanced circumvention or others, such as mobile phones, digital cameras and social network platforms. Using these day-to-day technologies may unknowingly put the citizen at risk. Organizations inside and outside these countries must consider these risks and work to educate the public on these risks as much as possible. Recent examples of this include the Iran regime, which rooted out people from social network platforms and pictures of crowds that were posted on the Internet, arresting individuals that could be identified. These are examples of crowd-sourced police state thuggery, where the same tools and approaches being used to advance democracy were also used to suppress it. In summary, knowing these risks and even embracing these guidelines, in closed societies the state has significant advantages over citizens. While political or civic organizations can often find “moments of opportunity” to use technologies in new ways that allow them to make gains, which should be encouraged, they often do so at great risk and thus these type of activities should be approached cautiously.